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 The advancement of computer technology is playing an important role in almost 
all fields in the construction industry in the current era. It has become a tool for 
exchanging legal contract information, including bid data. In the traditional closed 
bidding system, the bidders were unaware of their competitors‟ bid quotes and had no 
opportunity available to make a counter an offer to the bid at a different level. However, 
in reverse auction bidding (RAB), contractors can track their competitors‟ bids and take 
the given opportunity to re-bid the projects at lower rates. Unlike traditional auctions, 
where buyers raise their purchasing prices to outbid competitors, reverse auctions permit 
buyers to purchase goods and services from suppliers who are encouraged to sell them at 
the lowest price.  The benefit of the reverse auction bidding is either that the vendors are 
able to re-bid, or lower their bid multiple times. This is an example of transparent 
economic information.  
 
ABSTRACT 
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Van Vleet initiated the ongoing Reverse Auction Bidding study at Texas A&M 
University. Van Vleet had created a Microsoft Access database system and ASP web 
based user interface for RAB study. The methodology developed by van Vleet is still 
being used today, and this study has been extended into analyzing different personality 
types and the impact on the bidding system. In the previous studies conducted by 
different researchers in TAMU, the performance of participants in the RAB process 
along with their behavior are being observed with respect to their personality. 
Personality of each player is tested using the Keirsey Temperament Sorter (KTS) test. 
The previous study states that there appears to be a strong correlation between 
personality type and game performance. The first case study conducted by van Vleet 
involved five participants who had no prior experience in Reverse Auction Bidding. The 
number of participants has varied from three to ten participants.  
This research has been conducted on graduate students of the Construction 
Science Department of TAMU who have no prior experience in RAB. In continuation 
with the previous studies held in TAMU, the results show that there is an observable 
pattern in the bidding strategy of first time bidders while taking part in Reverse Auction 
Bidding.  
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BACKGROUND 
With the global presence of computers and the nearly universal reach of the 
Internet, there is widespread use of online auctioning for the sale of goods. Therefore, it 
should be a surprise to no one that owners would think of a way to use them to get lower 
prices for purchase of goods and services. The concept is to describe what someone 
wants to buy and then let providers compete with one another to lower their prices until 
a pre-set time or other cut-off, and it is called electronic reverse auction bidding 
(ERAB).  
In 2004 Van Vleet found that some construction firms were claiming they were 
finding it difficult to compete and remain profitable in the current economic market. He 
also observed that those firms had a high failure and lower rates of returns. Van Vleet 
then researched a new system of bidding called reverse auction bidding (RAB). Reverse 
auction bidding has created a great deal of dispute tied with the added issues of rising 
costs, increasing competition, high failure rates and marginal rates of return. However, 
comprehensive research at Texas A&M University has provided some evidence that 
RAB can offer a reasonable return to shareholders and banks of the contractors, even 
though with the strain of the bidding system perhaps interfering with the development of 
the contractor to owner relationship (van Vleet 2004). 
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of Adult Education Quarterly. 
INTRODUCTION 
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Some researchers propose that RAB reduces contractor profit which in turn may 
compromise quality of the job and safety on the sites. Angelo (2002), Gregory (2006); 
and Panchal (2007) identified three different classifications of bidders as:  
 Economic winner – One who generates the highest average job price 
 Economic loser – One who generates the lowest average job price 
 Average bidder – Bidder with average returns 
Sushil (2009) proposed that an owner‟s representative‟s interference in bidding can 
affect the result of reverse auction bidding and his research demonstrated this 
phenomenal. Chouhan (2009) categorized the personalities of the bidder using Keirsey 
Temperament Sorter (KTS) and postulated the following classification as: 
 Economically effective bidder 
 Economically ineffective bidder 
 Members generating average distribution returns 
Guhya (2010) extended the above study and defined series of games within RAB. 
Machado (2009) proposed that Number of bidder‟s participating in Reverse Auction 
Bidding is directly proportional to psychological effect on bidder‟s personality and 
Aggressive bidder is more successful in Reverse Auction Bidding than Average bidder. 
Saigaonkar (2010) and Gupta (2010) showed that out of the four primary personalities 
according to the KTS, the Guardians have a better performance than the other three 
personality types in a controlled game.  
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PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This research study is carried out to evaluate the bidding strategy and the 
observable typical pattern for the first time bidders of reverse auction bidding. The 
research will use game theory to analyze bidder‟s behavior changes in changing 
situations and personality testing to determine if there is a relationship between first time 
bidding and generated patterns.  
RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Is there an observational pattern of the bidding strategy of the first time bidders 
using   reverse auction bidding?  
SUB PROBLEM 
Is there any correlation between first time bidding and the profits patterns of the 
bidding, irrespective of the personality of the bidder in a Reverse Auction Bidding 
model? 
LIMITATIONS 
The scope of research study will be limited to following factors: 
 The study is limited to construction management graduate students from 
the Department of Construction Science, Texas A&M University  
 This study was performed in a controlled setting, limiting the variables 
that exist in the market place, as well as the risk related to the daily 
transaction of business.  The controlled setting was necessary in order to 
establish clear lines for evaluating participant behavior patterns. 
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 This study will not address any misprint errors, omissions and 
miscalculations that are caused due to participant‟s online bidding 
process. 
 The bidder‟s background e.g. their origin, past will not be taken into 
account in details.  
SIGNIFICANCE 
Although Reverse Auction Bidding has been proved to be very useful in 
procuring goods and services, there are some controversial arguments that it has created 
serious impact on owner-bidder relationship. This study aims to analyze first time 
bidder‟s behavior and strategy to gain strategic position over other bidders. This study 
will also try to analyze the profit patterns of the first time bidders. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The research is divided into four detailed aspects namely definitions of the game, 
the reverse auction bidding process, the personality testing and the analysis of the game.  
DEFINITIONS 
A comprehensive set of definitions was provided by Guhya (2010) that are 
relevant to the reverse auction bidding system applied at Texas A&M University 
System. These definitions taken verbatim are as follows:  
 Reverse Auction Bidding: Single or multiple-item, open, descending-price 
auction. The initiator specifies the opening bid price and bid decrement. 
Each bidder submits a successively lower bid. At the end of the auction, 
the bidders with the lowest bids win (van Vleet 2004).  
 Game Theory: A formal analysis of conflict and cooperation among 
intelligent and rational decision makers (van Vleet 2004).  
 Collusion: A secret agreement between two or more parties for a 
fraudulent, illegal, or deceitful purpose (van Vleet 2004).  
 Bidders Personality: “The dictionary defines personality in several ways. 
One definition emphasizes the public, social stimulus, or behavioral 
characteristics of a person that are visible to other people and make an 
impression on them. Another definition stresses a person‟s private, 
central, inner core. Included within this private core are the motives, 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
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attitudes, interests, believes, fantasies, cognitive styles and other mental 
processes of an individual. Some definitions of personality emphasize its 
“person” quality, personal existence, or identity features. Other meanings 
of personality are associated with specific disciplines or professions” 
(Panchal 2007).  
 Responsive Bidder: A bidder whose bid satisfies all the terms and 
conditions of bidding, delivery requirements, detailed specifications is 
called responsive bidder.  
 Aggressive Bidder: Aggressive bidders are the bidders who attain highest 
overall returns in the entire bidding process (Chouhan 2009).  
 Average Bidder: Average bidders are bidders who attain average 
distribution of returns in the entire bidding process (Chouhan 2009).  
 Success Rate: It is a ratio of number of bids won by a bidder to total 
number of bids made by that particular bidder.  
 Bidding Aggression: It is a ratio of total number of bids made by an 
individual bidder to total number of bids made by all the bidders in the 
reverse auction bidding pool.  
 Bidder: An entity that submits bid. In this game, there are usually three to 
ten bidders. 
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GAME DEFINITIONS 
The following list contains terms associated with the reverse auction bidding 
game. These terms were defined by  Van Vleet (2004), Panchal (2007), Chaudhary 
(2009) and Guhya (2010). They are: 
    player : This represents the bidder group, treated as a single entity for 
the purpose of game analysis. 
 
i  player : The i
th
 bidder in the bidding group. 
   player : This represents the purchaser. 
   game : The postulated sub-game played between bidders in seeking 
economic advantage over the remaining bidders. This game almost 
always disadvantages the   player, but the   player created the system 
and so is responsible for the   player‟s economic losses as a result. 
   game : The postulated sub-game played within the Reverse Auction 
Bidding game between the purchaser and the bidders. In terms of this 
analysis, it is deemed to effectively reduce to a two-player game, with 
competition implications for all players. The   player in reality sees only 
the average of all won bids.  
   :  Bid time allowed for each round of play in the game. 
   : Period between bid times   that represents the work time in the 
game. 
 j
B
 : i
th
 bid 
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 
vB  : Accepted bid for each job. 
   : This variable is a fixed dollar sum, representing the    player‟s base 
price, although in this game K is a vector of costs.  
    : This variable is a fixed dollar sum, representing the    player‟s 
maximum incremental price above   
   : This variable is normally defined by the set of numbers 
{ | 0 1}   , although negative values of  are permitted by the 
Reverse Auction Bidding system.   is used to normalize the profit data. 
A negative 
j  represents a loss on direct costs to the i player who 
makes this type of bid, and enough of these bids will lead to a bankrupt 
player. This type of play is discouraged as the assumption in the game is 
steady state economic conditions in the outside economy. Future studies 
may look at a failing market, but that is beyond this study.  
PERSONALITY TYPE 
Rogers (2010) originally suggested the use of the Keirsey Temperament Sorter 
Test to look at the difference in personality between a Type   and Type  types. It 
consists of 71 questions. The exact questions were listed in Appendix A. 
DIFFERENT PERSONALITY TYPES 
Table 1 below shows the Keirsey Temperament Sorter Test Summary. 
 
 9 
Table 1 KTS Different Personality Types 
 Temperament Role Role Variant 
Introspective 
(N) 
Idealist (NF) 
Diplomatic 
Mentor (NFJ) 
Developing 
Teacher (ENFJ): Educating 
Counselor (INFJ): Guiding 
Advocate (NFP) 
Mediating 
Champion (ENFP): Motivating 
Healer (INFP): Conciliating 
Rational (NT) 
Strategic 
Coordinator (NTJ) 
Arranging 
Field marshal (ENTJ): Mobilizing 
Mastermind (INTJ): Entailing 
Engineer (NTP) 
Constructing 
Inventor (ENTP): Devising 
Architect (INTP): Designing 
Observant 
(S) 
Guardian (SJ) 
Logistical 
Administrator (STJ) 
Regulating 
Supervisor (ESTJ): Enforcing 
Inspector (ISTJ): Certifying 
Conservator (SFJ) 
Supporting 
Provider (ESFJ): Supplying 
Protector (ISFJ): Securing 
Artisan (SP) 
Tactical 
Operator (STP) 
Expediting 
Promoter (ESTP): Persuading 
Crafter (ISTP): Instrumenting 
Entertainer (SFP) 
Improvising 
Performer (ESFP): Demonstrating 
Composer (ISFP): Synthesizing 
 
Table 2 shows the individual components in the temperament scale. The issue is 
equal scores between groups being assigned to one category.  The issue should be 
considered in future studies. 
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Table 2 Summary of Individual Components of the Different Personality Types 
Letter Name 
Meaning 
E Extraversion 
Feel motivated by interaction with people. Tend to enjoy a 
wide circle of acquaintances, and gain energy in social 
situations 
N Intuition 
More abstract than concrete. Focus attention on the big picture 
rather than the details, and on future possibilities rather than 
immediate realities 
F Feeling 
Value personal considerations above objective criteria. When 
making decisions, often give more weight to social 
implications than to logic 
J Judgment Plan activities and make decisions early. Derive a sense of 
control through predictability 
I Introversion 
Quiet and reserved. Generally prefer interacting with a few 
close friends rather than a wide circle of acquaintances, and 
expend energy in social situations 
P Perception Withhold judgment and delay important decisions, preferring 
to "keep their options open" should circumstances change 
T Thinking 
Value objective criteria above personal preference. When 
making decisions, generally give more weight to logic than to 
social considerations 
S Sensing 
More concrete than abstract. Focus attention on the details 
rather than the big picture, and on 
immediate realities rather than future possibilities 
 
REVERSE AUCTION SYSTEM 
Reverse Auction Bidding (RAB) is a process in which a buyer of goods and 
services continues to request bids from sellers until the buyer is satisfied they have 
received an acceptably low price although time does become a problem that ultimately 
limits the bidding process. In a conventional bidding method, general contractors submit 
their bids, or pre-selected general contractors plead for bids from subcontractors, and 
there is no opportunity for subsequent bidding after the specified time for bid opening. 
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In recent years, the Reverse Auction Bidding process has become a more 
accepted tool, which facilitates competitive and collaborative interactions among buyers 
and suppliers with online negotiations, even though with resistance in the construction 
field due to the perception of bid shopping.  
Horlen et al., (2005) noted that reverse auction can harm owner-buyer long term 
relationship, collaboration, quality of product, reliability, service and product delivery. 
Further, involvement of third party and unknown bidders in competition will result in 
poor selection of bidders affecting long-term business relationships, standing, 
performance, and responsibility. This observation is not necessarily true for all 
relationships and requires further work to be proven at his stage, although Panchel 
(2007) briefly considered this issue  in his research. 
Jap (2007) provides quantitative evidence that suppliers tends to become 
suspicious about buyers strategy, which affects the owner – bidder relationship in 
reverse auction bidding. One can consider that the selection of a RAB system will not 
cultivate a positive relationship as the purchaser is making the strong statement that 
“Price is everything with all else equal” (Nichols, 2010). As stated by Nichols: 
“In some settings this is acceptable, but the purchaser must expect the supplier to 
respond in kind”. Van Vleet (2004) noted this behavior and it was termed as tacit 
collusions. Recent work suggests that it is part of a game strategy adopted by the 
suppliers in response to the purchaser‟s acquisition method. Nichols considers that it is 
normal economic behavior and reflects in part the lack of understanding of the 
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purchasers of the problems with RAB created by their adoption of this economic system. 
A simple way to look at it is “that a fool and his money are soon parted.”  
Jap (2007) reports that only 5% of the people they interviewed suggested that 
reverse auction process can improve relationships. Chouhan (2009) opined that this 
means that rest (95%) believe it is harmful, although the converse may simply be that the 
average supplier sees no change in the relationship as they continue to treat the client in 
a professional manner.  
Engelbrecht – Wiggans (2007) argues that as there are repeated interactions 
between owner and bidders in the whole bidding process, bidder‟s behavior can be 
affected by issues external to auction like gaining a strategic position over other bidders 
and buyer for his own economic concerns. Jap conducted research on aggressiveness of 
bidder by considering various factors such as total number of bids a supplier make, the 
rate of making bids and degree of price concessions they offer. From this Jap concluded 
the following: 
“Suppliers who are interested in making specific investment with buyer and also 
those who want to develop long term relationship with the buyer will submit few bids, 
bid at greater intervals and make less reduction in profit margin in the entire bidding 
process compared to rest of the suppliers”. Guhya‟s (2010) work would not necessarily 
support this view, it is dependent on the Herfindahl Index of the bidding game and the 
personalities of the bidders. 
Suppliers who frequently submitted bids and made heavy reductions in profit 
margin have lower propensity of relationship post-auction with the buyer, which suggest 
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that reverse auction is a “negative price haggling” process. Nichols suggests this may be 
personality driven by looking at the statistics of the lost money in the bidding process. 
Guhya was the first to determine the lost money.  
From these observations, Jap concluded that, “Strategic bidding behavior of 
suppliers in which they appear to trade off potential economic and rational investments 
is long term exchange with short term pricing concessions”. 
There were several other key findings regarding reverse auctions in Jap‟s 
research as the number of bidders in the auction increases, suppliers lose interest in 
reverse auction bidding process and tend to bid less aggressively. The reasons for this 
are yet to be determined according to Jap. Although in any reasoned consideration of the 
cost of doing business this is to be expected. Some believe that bidders become skeptical 
about the presence of non-qualified bidders bidding in the reverse auction process or of 
faked bidding as studied by Panchal (2007). 
There may be possibility that if number of suppliers is excessive within bidding 
process, bidders may lose interest, refuse to bid against non-responsible bidders and start 
looking for alternative buyers. Again this is normal economic behavior.  
According to Staw (1976), “Bidding aggressiveness in response to total number 
of bids by others may represent a psychological escalation of commitment”. Jap (2007) 
states that supplier‟s frequency of bidding decreases with increase in duration of event of 
reverse auction, which could affect overall price savings for the buyer. This is normal 
behavior observed in the current set of studies. 
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It has been postulated that emotions can affect a bidder‟s personality and 
response to the RAB game in a systematic way. Bosman and Riedl (2004) argue that 
bidders who are in negative emotional state of mind have a tendency to increase the 
number of made bids in bidding process. But, bidders with positive emotional state of 
mind remain unchanged in their bidding behavior. This statement suggests that negative 
emotions induce more competitive bidding, although this is far from proven.  
Further Bosman and Riedl (2004) concluded that it is very necessary to 
understand bidder‟s behavior and his emotions need to be taken into consideration at the 
time of bidding. The available evidence suggests that people who feel good are inclined 
to take less risk than people who feel neutral, in particular when the stakes are high.  
Bosman and Riedl (2004) noted that people with positive emotions retain their 
state of mind whereas people with negative emotions can affect risk behavior in different 
ways. Raghunathan and Pham (1999) suggested that anxious individuals opt for “low 
risk – low reward” option whereas sad individuals opt for “high risk – high reward” 
option. People in positive emotional states tend to make optimistic judgments and 
choices whereas people with negative emotional states tend to make pessimistic 
judgments and choices.  
Chouhan (2009) postulated that there is a difference between aggressive and 
average bidders. Chaudhary (2009) suggests with good reason that this is due to 
personality types and factors.  
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ANALYSIS OF THE GAME 
The standard methods were established by Guhya (2010) for an analysis of the 
Reverse Auction Bidding game.  
The key factors are as follows: 
 Rate of bidding in units of minutes 
 Distribution of the bids during the game play 
 Lost money 
 Return  
 Return against loan 
 Personality 
SUMMARY 
It is a common held belief that reverse auction bidding drive down the cost of the 
project which in turns saves large amount of money for the owner. Horlen and others 
(2005) point out that there are lots of advantages to using reverse auction bidding to the 
owner, but along with all of these advantages there are lots of barriers. Reverse auction 
can and will harm the owner‟s long-term relationship with the contractor. It also may 
create some problem with quality of product, reliability, service, and product delivery. 
With the involvement of a third party and many unknown bidders in competition, it 
might result in a poor selection of bidders which will affect long term business 
relationships, reputation, performance and accountability (Horlen & others 2005, 
Machado 2009, Van Vleet, 2004, Jabs, 2007). This study will conclude some of these 
points. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The methodology of the research is divided into two distinctive sections namely 
the game setup and the data collection. 
GAME SETUP 
In this game, KTS is used to test the personalities of the bidders. Four players are 
invited to take part in the RAB game. The consent form will be signed by all the 
participants who are willing to participate in the RAB game. The bidders are encouraged 
to gain maximum profit out of each job. All bidders are provided with an initial amount 
of 40,000 USD. As we are assuming that this is a normal economic period, the RAB 
system Considers realistic scenarios and factors such as travel and delivery charges, rain 
delays, delays due to distant projects and other variables that affect the construction 
daily business. The bidders bid for 15 minutes. 
A set of instructions and rules provided to the bidders (participants) in the game 
process during simulation. It includes the details related to the project, description, and 
variables that affect the project as well as its duration.  The instructions set are as 
follows: 
 The total duration of the game will be a maximum of nine consecutive 
weeks. 
 All bidders initially have an equal dollar amount of $40,000 available in 
their bank accounts. 
METHODOLOGY 
 17 
 The base cost for each job has been estimated by a competent estimator 
as $10,000 (van Vleet, 2004). This cost does not include any applicable 
travel and delivery charges. The amount of these excluded costs will be 
posted on web site for each job along with some other relevant details 
such as job site address, access information and other details necessary 
to commence the job on time. 
 The default duration to complete each job is five scenario days of 
construction time, excluding rain periods. 
 Work week begins on Monday and ends on Saturday. The work week is 
six days long. 
 All bidders are limited initially to work on only three jobs per week. 
 If they desire to work on more than three jobs per week they then have to 
take a loan out to finance for each additional job. The additional 
borrowing charges are $500 that will be charged automatically every 
time they borrow a loan irrespective of whether they win a job or not. 
 Since the base cost for all jobs is $10,000, and the default duration is five 
days, each bidder makes $2000 per day for all jobs. This construction 
cost will be accrued on daily basis. In addition, travel expenses and 
delivery charges are also accrued on a daily basis, as determined by the 
job site location costs built into the system. 
 The main office of the owner is located in Sugar Land and the travel and 
delivery expenses will be determined on the basis of distance of job site 
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from this location as all subcontractors have offices within a mile of the 
owner. 
 The minimum acceptable return on investment derived from long term 
construction industry standards is 10 percent. This is not checked during 
the game, but the players are warned of this requirement. 
 Payment for work is scheduled to be delivered at the completion of the 
fifth construction day. 
 They will have exactly 15 minutes to place bids. 
 The main objective of all the bidders is to maximize their profits, whilst 
maintain bank confidence and acceptable liquidity. 
Table 3 below shows the location details of the different sites used in the RAB game. 
 
Table 3 Site Location Details 
Site # Location of Development 
Distance from Sugar Land 
(kilometers) 
1 Brookside Village 41.6 
2 Piney Point Village 24 
3 Highlands 70.4 
4 Jersey Village 40 
5 Bunker Hill Village 27.2 
6 Richmond 14.4 
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GAME PLAY 
As the game had four players with a nominal capacity of three jobs per week, 
random dice rolls using two dice were used to determine the number of jobs that were 
available each week. The number of jobs per week had also been determined by using 
dice previously. However, bidders can increase the bid capacity and also can acquire an 
additional job above their financial capacity by utilizing the option of borrowing money 
taking a loan from the bank. This option was made available to each participant during 
actual bidding process. Once the bidders are at their full capacity, the program is set in 
such a way that it will ask the participant if they would like to increase their capacity. 
DATA COLLECTION 
In 2004 using Microsoft Access, van Vleet created a website using ASP 
programming connected to an access database. This ASP site was used to run the online 
simulation of the bidding game. This website allowed participants to submit their bid 
information, and the site would also collect the data for the analysis of the bidding 
behavior. Details of the ASP programming are given in the paper by Guhya (2010). 
Gregory encountered connection problems with the Microsoft Access database as ten 
bidders tried to get online at one time. 
Wellington configured an alternative SQL Server 2005 database for the game site 
in 2006. Texas A&M University‟s College of Architecture computers were set as the 
server location created to host the reverse auction game where each participant enters the 
system and they assigned a login screen with username and password entry boxes for 
each individual participant. 
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Each participant was provided with a unique login name, being: 
 Hammer Co. 
 Driver Co. 
 Pliers Co. 
 Concrete Co. 
Using a unique password, each participant controls their access to the site. These 
specific login name and password allowed each participant to enter the website and 
access the contract data. However, the limitation of the server is that it restricted 
participant‟s access to the information that was relevant only to their bidding. 
In the design of the web page, allowances were made such that the bidding 
process minimized the irrelevant information given to the bidders. The significant 
information includes the job cost, current bids and the bidder‟s name. In addition, before 
bidding time commences or after bidding was closed, no bids could be placed. Bidding 
is set to occur for a 15 minute time span, and then the system was closed for 5 minutes. 
It is usually considered as a break time for the participants. 
After starting a session, the participants were taken to the All Current Bids screen 
as shown in Fig. 1. This screen provides bid information including location of the site 
and related cost for each job. This was the identical information provided for all 
participants. 
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Figure 1. All Current Bids Screen from RAB Web Site (Guhya,2010) 
 
As described earlier, participants were limited to bid on only three jobs per week. 
Upon accepting the bank guarantee, a fee of five hundred dollars was deducted from the 
bidders account located on the My Bids Info page. Fig. 2 shows the screen that offers the 
participant a chance to accept the bank cost. 
 
 
Figure 2. Bank Guarantee Web Form (Guhya,2010) 
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There are some strict protocols established while designing the game to ensure 
that only a lower value is accepted during the bidding process. The screen is prompted as 
shown in Fig.3 to warn the bidders that they are not allowed to enter a higher bid amount 
than the current lowest bid amount. 
 
Figure 3. Higher than Acceptable Bid Web Statement (Guhya, 2010) 
 
My Jobs in Progress bar shows My Bids Info page as shown in Fig. 4. 
 
Figure 4. My Bid Info Web Page (Guhya,2010) 
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As Saigaonkar (2010) noted „My Bid Info Page‟ displays the bid and job 
information relevant to a particular bidder. Participants were able to have access to this 
page throughout this game process and they were encouraged to visit it frequently. This 
page contains job relevant information that helps the participant to ensure their job 
status. This page includes the following data: 
 All active jobs that participant has won, under the category My Jobs in 
Progress 
 Jobs that participant is bidding, under the category “My Active Bids. All 
information under this tab came directly from All Current Bids page, so 
this also provides the current status of the bidding game to show whether 
the participant had been outbid on a particular job. 
 List of all successfully completed jobs, under the category My Completed 
Jobs. 
This screen also shows the financial state of the participant, which helps the 
bidder in framing a future strategies such as how many jobs a bidder could bid for, and if 
the bidder is already lagging behind due to his uncompleted jobs, how much money a 
bidder would have to borrow from bank and other financial institutions to bid for a job in 
the following week. This financial information is provided under the category My 
Summary. The information is: 
 Current calculated cash assets 
 Capacity for additional works including jobs with bank guarantees 
 Cumulative loan charges till date 
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Current financial condition provides the working capital information to the 
participants as shown on Fig. 5. It is calculated by deducting costs of current jobs and 
bank loans from the profits of completed jobs. The initial capitol is $40,000 and the bank 
guarantee is $500 per loan. The formula used is: 
Current Financial Condition = (Capital + Profits) – (Costs of Current Jobs + 
Bank Costs) 
 
 
Figure 5. All Completed Jobs Screen (Guhya,2010) 
 
PERSONALITY TYPES 
Each participant involved in the bidding was requested to take the Keirsey 
Temperament Sorter (KTS) Test. Guhya (2010) had developed the standard set of 
procedures to analyze the results. The information about personality type of a bidder 
involved in the game process was collected to compare the personality types against the 
returns each participant made in the game. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The research is conducted in three phases, namely: 
 Personality Testing 
 Reverse Auction Bidding Game Play 
 Analysis of the Results 
PERSONALITY TESTING 
The preliminary step of this research was personality testing. Four students from 
the graduate class in the Construction Science Department were randomly selected and 
tasked to take the Keirsey Temperament Personality Sorter Test. The precaution taken 
was none of the participant should have any prior experience of RAB. The bidders and 
their personality types are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 Player and Personality Type 
Bidder Name Assigned No.  KTS Result Personality Type 
Hammer 1 ISFP Artisan-Composer 
Driver 2 INFP Idealist-Healer 
Plier 3 ESTJ Guardian-Supervisor 
Concrete 4 ISFJ Guardian-Protector 
 
RESULTS 
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REVERSE AUCTION BIDDING GAME 
The game was played on 21st Sep. 2010 at College of Architecture, TAMU. The 
game commenced at 4:00 PM and lasted for nine game sets of fifteen minutes duration 
each. Number of jobs available in each week is shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 Number of Jobs per Week and Descriptive Statistics 
Week No. of jobs 
1 6 
2 13 
3 3 
4 5 
5 9 
6 7 
7 11 
8 4 
9 11 
Mean 7.67 
Std. deviation 3.5 
Total 69 
 
Fig. 6 shows a histogram of the jobs per week.  
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Figure 6. Histogram of Number of Jobs and Number of Bids per Week  
 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS  
The analysis of results examines bid period results, profit data and differential 
bid data from the bidding process. 
(Chouhan 2009) proposed that there are four trend periods which could be 
observed in a reverse auction bidding game. The trends were generally observed in the 
majority of the research studies conducted previously on Reverse Auction Bidding. The 
four trend periods are shown in Table 6.   
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Table 6 Trend Periods and Data as Postulated by Chouhan (2009) 
Period Identifier Description of the Trend Period 
A Learning 
B Discovering 
C Competitive 
D Profit Gain 
 
 
The analysis of the bidding trend of the current participants was done by dividing 
the game into nine consecutive game sets. The profit gained by the winning bidder 
assists in identifying the trend. Table 7 provides the profit data and the winner in the first 
15 minutes of the game play. It can be seen that profits range from $19 to $3086. This 
confirms that all the participants have not yet acquainted to the game play and are being 
competitive. The data showed that they also made some errors in bidding process. This 
tells us that it‟s their learning phase. The discovering trend of the participants is not 
observable in this study which is not a typical.  
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Table 7 First Bid Period 
Job ID Revised ID Cost ($) Profit ($) 
Bidder 
ID 
1645 37 $18,316.00 $34.00 1 
1644 38 $11,701.00 $19.00 1 
1643 39 $12,835.00 $65.00 2 
1649 40 $12,835.00 $65.00 2 
1648 41 $14,725.00 $1,675.00 2 
1647 42 $14,914.00 $3,086.00 3 
1646 43 $12,835.00 $165.00 4 
 
 
Tables 8, 9, 10 show that during second, third and fourth period there was an 
observable discovering phase. The profit ranging from $0.50 to $2884 was observed. 
This shows that the participants were still discovering and exploring the game and highly 
competitive. It was also stated in the previous research that participants of the Guardian 
type personality are the most competent bidders and thus the competitive behavior of 
these participants can be seen in the respective tables (Gupta 2009). 
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Table 8 Second Bid Period 
Job ID Revised ID Cost ($) Profit ($) 
Bidder 
ID 
1613 7 $18,316.00 $1.00 4 
1615 8 $18,316.00 $2,884.00 4 
1616 9 $13,213.00 $2,786.00 4 
1618 10 $12,835.00 $2,515.00 4 
1619 11 $14,725.00 $1,275.00 4 
1620 12 $13,213.00 $2,336.00 4 
1621 13 $14,725.00 $25.00 4 
1622 14 $18,316.00 $0.50 4 
1625 15 $18,316.00 $33.00 4 
1614 16 $11,701.00 $1,099.00 4 
1617 17 $11,701.00 $749.00 4 
1623 18 $11,701.00 $749.00 4 
1624 19 $11,701.00 -$201.00 4 
 
Table 9 Third Bid Period 
Job ID Revised ID Cost ($) Profit ($) 
Bidder 
ID 
1627 20 $18,316.00 $184.00 1 
1626 21 $11,701.00 $1,099.00 2 
1628 22 $12,835.00 $565.00 2 
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Table 10 Forth Bid Period 
Job ID Revised ID Cost ($) Profit ($) 
Bidder 
ID 
1630 23 $14,914.00 $1,086.00 1 
1629 24 $18,316.00 $2,584.00 2 
1631 25 $14,725.00 $2,275.00 2 
1633 26 $18,316.00 $84.00 2 
1632 27 $12,835.00 $2,165.00 3 
 
Tables 11, 12, 13 show that during fifth, sixth and seventh period there was 
extremely high competition. Everybody tried to win the bid even though the profit 
margins were low.  This is again atypical. 
 
Table 11 Fifth Bid Period 
Job ID Revised ID Cost ($) Profit ($) 
Bidder 
ID 
1634 28 $14,725.00 $275.00 2 
1635 29 $11,701.00 $199.00 2 
1636 30 $13,213.00 $687.00 2 
1638 31 $14,914.00 -$14.00 2 
1641 32 $13,213.00 $1.00 4 
1637 33 $12,835.00 $5.00 4 
1639 34 $18,316.00 $2.00 4 
1640 35 $18,316.00 $1.00 4 
1642 36 $14,914.00 $1.00 4 
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Table 12 Sixth Bid Period 
Job ID Revised ID Cost ($) Profit ($) 
Bidder 
ID 
1645 37 $18,316.00 $34.00 1 
1644 38 $11,701.00 $19.00 1 
1643 39 $12,835.00 $65.00 2 
1649 40 $12,835.00 $65.00 2 
1648 41 $14,725.00 $1,675.00 2 
1647 42 $14,914.00 $3,086.00 3 
1646 43 $12,835.00 $165.00 4 
 
Table 13 Seventh Bid Period 
Job ID Revised ID Cost ($) Profit ($) 
Bidder 
ID 
1659 44 $18,316.00 $133.00 1 
1650 45 $12,835.00 -$1.00 2 
1652 46 $12,835.00 $1,155.00 3 
1651 47 $14,725.00 $14.00 4 
1653 48 $13,213.00 -$3.00 4 
1654 49 $14,914.00 $636.00 4 
1655 50 $11,701.00 $1,148.00 4 
1656 51 $11,701.00 $299.00 4 
1657 52 $14,914.00 $86.00 4 
1658 53 $11,701.00 -$502.00 4 
1660 54 $14,914.00 $285.00 4 
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During eighth and ninth bid period we can observe the maximum profit gain 
range as shown in Tables 14, and 15. Even though there was one negative profit job in 
ninth period, rest all jobs have a higher profit which matches the Chouhan theory. 
 
Table 14 Eighth Bid Period 
Job ID Revised ID Cost ($) Profit ($) 
Bidder 
ID 
1664 55 $11,701.00 $16,299.00 1 
1661 56 $14,725.00 $5,275.00 2 
1663 57 $13,213.00 $11,787.00 3 
1662 58 $14,725.00 $5,274.00 4 
 
Table 15 Ninth Bid Period 
Job ID Revised ID Cost ($) Profit ($) 
Bidder 
ID 
1665 59 $12,835.00 $2,164.00 4 
1666 60 $18,316.00 $2,683.00 4 
1668 61 $14,725.00 $2,175.00 4 
1669 62 $14,725.00 $2,274.00 4 
1670 63 $12,835.00 -$175.00 4 
1671 64 $14,914.00 $2,536.00 4 
1673 65 $13,213.00 $5,787.00 4 
1674 66 $12,835.00 $1,155.00 4 
1667 67 $11,701.00 $2,049.00 4 
1672 68 $11,701.00 $2,299.00 4 
1675 69 $11,701.00 $2,669.00 4 
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Table 16 compares the results of the bid periods using the statistical t-test 
analysis. This confirmed the bidding trends as postulated by Chouhan (2009). There was 
significant difference in bidding period one and two. Again during fourth and fifth, there 
was a very significant difference in bidding trend, which proved that the bidding trend 
shifted from discovering to competitive phase. The same difference was observed in 
seventh and eighth bidding period.  
 
Table 16 Student‟s t-test Analysis 
Bid Period Compared to t test value Difference 
1 2 3.37 Significant 
2 3 0.69 Not Significant 
3 4 1.58 Not Significant 
4 5 4.31 Very Significant 
5 6 1.67 Not Significant 
6 7 1.27 Not Significant 
7 8 6.11 Extremely Significant 
8 9 4.37 Significant 
 
Fig. 7 represents the nature of the bidding during the course of the game. Four 
different phases can be clearly marked and shown with the different colors as learning, 
discovering, competitive and profit gain. The boxplot shows the profit range of the 
participants. Fifth order polynomial trend line generated in the boxplot clearly identified 
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the four prominent trends of the bidding game. The trend is further increase by one 
interval to predict the future of the profit gain for all the participants. The R-square value 
of 0.808 shows a strong positive trend. Thus it can be said that during next rounds of the 
bidding game with the same players, maximum profit gain can be achieved. 
 
 
Figure 7. Boxplot for Profit 
 
Fig. 8 represents a trend for the number of jobs against the number of bids. The 
trend clearly identified that a steady increase in the number of bids is seen with the 
increase in the number of jobs although the correlation is not so strong. 
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Figure 8. Number of Bids versus Number of Jobs 
 
 
Table 17 and Fig. 9 show the number of bids in each minute of the bidding game 
play. A trend is observed. During first minute period the average bids were 4.44 and 
during last minute the average bids observed were 11.44. This is typical behavior. 
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Table 17 High, Low and Average Bids in Each Minute 
Minutes High Low Average 
1 12 0 4.44 
2 12 0 4.33 
3 12 0 4.00 
4 6 0 2.00 
5 6 0 3.00 
6 13 0 2.22 
7 6 0 2.89 
8 9 0 3.67 
9 19 0 7.22 
10 17 0 7.22 
11 14 0 4.56 
12 16 0 5.11 
13 19 0 6.67 
14 24 0 9.56 
15 30 0 11.44 
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Figure 9. High, Low and Average Bid in Every Minute Boxplot 
 
The trend line in Fig. 10 also shows an increase in the bidding. The R-square 
value of 0.862 confirmed this trend for the polynomial fit. 
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Figure 10. Trend of Average Bids per Minute 
 
Table 18 summarizes the rank of the bidder along with number of jobs, number 
of bids and bid efficiency. First bidder has a highest bid efficiency (Saigaonkar 
2010).This matches previous results.  
 
Table 18 Bid Efficiency of Each Personality 
Rank Bidder No. of Bids No. of jobs Bid Efficiency 
1 4 113 45 40% 
2 3 202 4 2% 
3 1 174 6 3% 
4 2 219 14 6% 
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Fig. 11 and Table 19 represent the rank of the bidder along with their loan 
amount and profit. It was clearly observed that rank one bidder took the minimum loan 
but gained maximum profit. This result is contradicting the previously stated results by 
Chouhan (2009), Peterson (2010), and Saigaonkar (2010) and requires further study. 
 
Table 19 Bank Loan and Profit Data 
Rank Loan Profit 
1 500 44028.5 
2 1000 18193 
3 2000 17755 
4 4000 14833 
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Figure 11. Bank Loan against Profit 
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Fig. 12 and Table 20 compare this study and the behavior of participants to the 
previous studies conducted by Gupta (2010), Van Vleet (2004) and Saigaonkar (2010). 
The participants from these prior researcher‟s study were selected because they had no 
prior experience of bidding i.e. first time bidders. This is a key constraint to the current 
work. All the previous studies studied the behavior of four major personalities 
(Guardian, Rational, Artisan and Idealist), it is interesting to observe the pattern of four 
of the role variants of the previously winning personality.  
The normalized profit is achieved by dividing all the profits in every job, by the 
maximum profit achieved. This procedure provides a maximum profit of one. The 
number of jobs being offered to participants was again observed to be different in 
previous studies (van Vleet, 2004; Saigaonkar, 2010; Gupta 2010), this is shown in 
Table 20. Thus these were again normalized using the same procedure. This procedure 
helps in making the comparison unbiased. It is clearly seen that the first time participants 
are more competitive driving the profits in the lower range (0 to 0.11). Again a high 
number of profits are observed in the range of 0.7 to 0.9. This indicates that during this 
phase the bidders have the strong understanding of the game thus gaining a high profit 
gain.  
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Figure 12.  Number of Entries in the Each Normalized Profit Range 
 
Table 20 shows the summation of total number of entries by Gupta (2010), Van 
Vleet (2004) and Saigaonkar (2010) and this research during each normalized profit 
period.   
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Table 20 Total Number of Entries in Normalized Profit Period 
  Bedekar Saigaonkar Van Vleet Gupta Total 
<0 12 2 0 4 18 
0-0.1 37 11 3 48 99 
0.11-0.2 9 7 35 1 52 
0.21-0.3 0 14 13 0 27 
0.31-0.4 0 9 4 0 13 
0.41-0.5 0 6 5 0 11 
0.51-0.6 0 2 2 1 5 
0.61-0.7 0 4 7 11 22 
0.71-0.8 0 2 2 12 16 
0.81-0.9 0 1 1 9 11 
0.91-1.0 1 5 1 7 14 
 
 
Fig. 13 and Fig. 14 show the observable strategic pattern of the first time bidders 
in RAB. Fig. 13 shows the graph of total number of entries against the normalized profit 
range period and Fig. 14 shows the graph of cumulative total number of entries against 
the normalized profit range period.  
It is very interesting to observe the competitive nature of the first time bidders in 
RAB. It is clearly observed in Fig. 14 that 50% of the total number of entries is located 
in the first 10% region of the normalized profit period.   
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Figure 13. Number of Entries Versus Normalized Profit Range 
 
 
Figure 14. Number of Entries Versus Cumulative Normalized Profit Range 
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This study is a part of ongoing research on Reverse Auction Bidding at TAMU. 
To summarize, the game was conducted between four participants of the Construction 
Science Department who had no prior experience of RAB. Using KTS (Keirsey 
Temperament Sorter) test, the personality testing was completed for the bidders. The 
RAB game comprised 9 bidding periods, each 15 minutes long. The bidding data was 
analyzed so as to obtain different strategic patterns of the bidding. The studies which 
were carried out previously at TAMU analyzed different personalities, their competency 
levels and the effect of interference of owner‟s agent during bidding. Different 
personalities were tested in different competitive bidding scenario.  
In this research, it is observed that the first time bidders have shown a significant 
pattern in their bidding strategy. The bidders were extremely competitive throughout the 
bidding, therefore the normalized profit level was very low. The profit gain phase started 
very late. During profit gain phase, bidders had enough understanding of RAB and 
nature of their competitors. The significant statistical pattern was found when the 
research results were compared with the previous first time bidding results. In this study, 
the bidder with the Guardian personality won majority of the jobs, hence confirmed the 
theory that the Guardians are the most proficient bidders. Four different phases of 
bidding namely learning, discovering, and competitive and profit gain were also 
observed during bidding process, but some were not strongly shown.  
CONCLUSIONS 
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This research was under the final phase of the preliminary study of RAB in 
TAMU. It can be taken one step further by creating an algorithms and computerized 
programs which will be designed to recognize the bidding strategy of the most efficient 
bidders during RAB process. The study can also be taken to an extent that those 
algorithms and programs will outbid that efficient bidder.  
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KEIRSEY TEMPERAMENT SORTER TEST 
Test method 
This test is taken from ……………………………………………………… 
For each question, decide on answer a or b and put a check mark in the 
proper column of the answer sheet.  Scoring directions are provided.  There is no 
right or wrong answers since about half the population agrees with whatever answer 
you choose.   
 
1. When the phone rings do you 
a. hurry to get to it first 
b. hope someone will 
answer 
2. Are you more 
a. observant than 
introspective 
b. introspective than 
observant 
3. Is it worse to  
a. have your head in the 
clouds 
b. be in a rut 
4. With people are you usually 
more 
a. firm than gentle 
b. gentle than firm 
5. Are you more comfortable in 
making 
a. critical judgments 
b. value judgments 
6. Is clutter in the workplace 
something you 
a. take time to straighten up 
b. tolerate pretty well 
7. Is it your way to  
a. make up your mind 
quickly 
b. pick an choose at some 
length 
8. Waiting in line, do you often 
a. chat with others 
b. stick to business 
9. Are you more 
a. sensible than ideational 
b. ideational than sensible 
10. Are you more interested in  
a. what is actual 
b. what is possible 
11. In making up your mind are you 
more likely  
a. to go by data 
b. to go by desires   
12. In sizing up others do you tend 
to be 
a. objective and impersonal 
b. friendly and personal 
13. Do you prefer contracts to be 
a. signed, sealed, and 
delivered 
b. settled on a handshake 
14. Are you more satisfied having 
a. a finished product 
b. work in progress 
15. At a party, do you 
a. interact with many, even 
strangers 
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b. interact with a few 
friends 
16. Do you tend to be more 
a. factual than speculative 
b. speculative than factual 
17. Do you like writers who 
a. say what they mean 
b. use metaphors and 
symbolism 
18. Which appeals to you more: 
a. consistency of thought 
b. harmonious relationships 
19. If you must disappoint someone 
are you  
a. usually frank and 
straightforward 
b. warm and considerate 
20. On the job do you want your 
activities 
a. scheduled 
b. unscheduled 
21. Do you more often prefer 
a. final, unalterable 
statements 
b. tentative, preliminary 
statements 
22. Does interacting with strangers 
a. energize you 
b. tax your reserves 
23. Facts 
a. speak for themselves 
b. illustrate principles 
24. Do you find visionaries and 
theorists 
a. somewhat annoying 
b. rather fascinating 
25. In a heated discussion, do you 
a. stick to your guns 
b. look for common ground 
26. Is it better to be 
a. Just 
b. merciful 
27. At work, is it more natural for 
you to 
a. point out mistakes 
b. try to please others 
28. Are you more comfortable 
a. after a decision 
b. before a decision 
29. Do you tend to 
a. say right out what‟s on 
your mind 
b. keep your ears open 
30. Common sense is 
a. usually reliable 
b. frequently questionable 
31. Children often do not 
a. make themselves useful 
enough 
b. exercise their fantasy 
enough 
32. When in charge of others do you 
tend to be 
a. firm and unbending 
b. forgiving and lenient 
33. Are you more often 
a. a cool-headed person 
b. a warm-hearted person 
34. Are you prone to 
a. nailing things down 
b. exploring the possibilities 
35. In most situations are you more 
a. deliberate than 
spontaneous 
b. spontaneous than 
deliberate 
36. Do you think of yourself as 
a. an outgoing person 
b. a private person 
37. Are you more frequently 
a. a practical sort of person 
b. a fanciful sort of person 
38. Do you speak more in  
a. particulars than 
generalities 
b. generalities than 
particular 
39. Which is more of a compliment: 
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a. “There‟s a logical 
person” 
b. “There‟s a sentimental 
person”  
40. Which rules you more 
a. your thoughts 
b. your feelings 
41. When finishing a job, do you 
like to 
a. tie up all the loose ends 
b. move on to something 
else 
42. Do you prefer to work 
a. to deadlines 
b. just whenever 
43. Are you the kind of person who 
a. is rather talkative 
b. doesn‟t miss much 
44. Are you inclined to take what is 
said 
a. more literally 
b. more figuratively 
45. Do you more often see 
a. what‟s right in front of 
you 
b. what can only be 
imagined 
46. Is it worse to be 
a. softy 
b. hard-nosed 
47. In trying circumstances are you 
sometimes 
a. too unsympathetic 
b. too sympathetic 
48. Do you tend to choose 
a. rather carefully 
b. somewhat impulsively 
49. Are you inclined to be more 
a. hurried than leisurely 
b. leisurely than hurried 
50. At work do you tend to 
a. be sociable with your 
colleagues 
b. keep more to yourself 
51. Are you more likely to trust 
a. your experiences 
b. your conceptions 
52. Are you more inclined to feel 
a. down to earth 
b. somewhat removed 
53. Do you think of yourself as a  
a. tough-minded person 
b. tender-hearted person 
54. Do you value in yourself more 
that you are 
a. reasonable 
b. devoted 
55. Do you usually want things 
a. settled and decided 
b. just penciled in 
56. Would you say you are more 
a. serious and determined 
b. easy going 
57. Do you consider yourself 
a. a good conversationalist 
b. a good listener 
58. Do you prize in yourself 
a. a strong hold on reality 
b. a vivid imagination 
59. Are you drawn more to 
a. fundamentals 
b. overtones 
60. Which seems the greater fault 
a. to be too compassionate 
b. to be too dispassionate 
61. Are you swayed more by 
a. convincing evidence 
b. a touching appeal 
62. Do you feel better about 
a. coming to closure 
b. keeping your options 
open 
63. Is it preferable mostly to  
a. make sure things are 
arranged 
b. just let things happen 
naturally 
64. Are you inclined to be 
 53 
a. easy to approach 
b. somewhat reserved 
65. In stories do you prefer 
a. action and adventure 
b. fantasy and heroism 
66. Is it easier for you to 
a. put others to good use 
b. identify with others 
67. Which do you wish more for 
yourself: 
a. strength of will 
b. strength of emotion 
68. Do you see yourself as basically 
a. thick-skinned 
b. thin-skinned 
69. Do you tend to notice 
a. disorderliness 
b. opportunities for change 
70. Are you more 
a. routinized than 
whimsical 
b. whimsical than 
routinized  
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Scoring Method and Answer Sheet 
Enter a check for each answer in the column for a or b 
 a b  a b  a b  a b  a b  a b  a b 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   
8   9   10   11   12   13   14   
15   16   17   18   19   20   21   
22   23   24   25   26   27   28   
29   30   31   32   33   34   35   
36   37   38   39   40   41   42   
43   44   45   46   47   48   49   
50   51   52   53   54   55   56   
57   58   59   60   61   62   63   
64   65   66   67   68   69   70   
 1   2 3      4 3   4 5   6 5   6 7   8 7   
         
 
 
   2                              
3 
  4                               
5 
  6                               
7 
  
 
         E         I                                      S         N                                        T       F                                        J        P 
 
1 
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Directions for Scoring 
These scoring directions are obtained from 
 Add down so that the total number of a answers is written in the box at 
the bottom of each column.  Do the same for the b answers you have 
checked.  Each of the 14 boxes should have a number it. 
 Transfer the number in box #1 of the answer grid to box #1 below the 
answer grid.  Do this for box # 2 as well.  Note, however, that you have 
two numbers for boxes 3 through 8.  Bring down the first number for each 
box beneath the second, as indicated by the arrows.  Now add all the 
pairs of numbers and enter the total in the boxes below the answer grid, 
so each box has only one number. 
 Now you have four pairs of numbers.  Circle the letter below the larger 
numbers of each pair.  If the two numbers of any pair are equal, then 
circle neither, but put a large X below them and circle it. 
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